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Abstract 
The article presents a theory that I denote “Relative Thinking Theory,” which claims that people 
consider relative differences and not only absolute differences when making various economics 
decisions, even in those cases where the rational model dictates that people should consider only 
absolute differences. The article reviews experimental evidence for this behavior, summarizing 
briefly several experiments I conducted, as well as some earlier related literature. It then 
discusses how we can think about relative thinking and formalize this behavior. Later, the article 
addresses several related questions: why do people exhibit relative thinking, whether it is 
beneficial to do so, and whether experience and education can change relative thinking. Finally, 
the article explains why firms seem to respond to relative thinking of consumers, and raises 
additional implications of relative thinking for economics and management.    2
1. Introduction 
The model of rational choice in economics assumes that people maximize their utility subject 
to their budget constraint. The utility function they maximize, in turn, is assumed to come from 
well-defined preferences. If we take two goods that are identical except for one difference, and 
ask a consumer to tell us how much more valuable to him is the preferred good between the two, 
the answer should not depend on the good’s price.
2  
For example, suppose that the difference between the goods is the location in which they can 
be purchased (but the good itself is identical). The good can be purchased either at a store 5 
minutes away, or at another store 35 minutes away. Suppose that the good is a baby crib that 
costs $300 at the remote store, and the consumer tells us that he would purchase it at the closer 
store as long as its price there does not exceed $340. That means that the consumer’s preferences 
are such that he prefers anything higher than $40 (the difference between $340 and $300) to 
saving an hour (30 minutes in each direction), but he prefers to save an hour to anything lower 
than $40. In other words, the value of his time when driving to shop, is valued (by himself) at 
$40 per hour. 
According to the model of rational choice, if the same consumer is then asked about a stroller 
that costs $20 in the remote store, he should be willing to purchase the same crib for up to $60 in 
the closer store. The extra cost of going to the remote store (compared to the cost of going to the 
closer one) is exactly the same regardless of the good to be purchased. Therefore, the minimal 
price difference for which the consumer chooses to go to the remote store must be the same 
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regardless of the good’s price. In other words, the consumer should only consider the absolute 
price difference between the goods, and not the relative price difference.
3  
In various experiments I conducted, however, I show that in practice consumers violate this 
principle in a significant and systematic way. In the context of differences in store location, 
consumers make choices that reflect valuation of time that increases when the good’s price 
increases. This leads consumers to make too much effort to save money when they purchase low-
price goods, and too little effort to save when they purchase high-price goods.  
In the context of product differentiation, the extra amount consumers are willing to pay for a 
preferred characteristic of a good is higher when the good’s price is higher, even though the 
characteristic has the same value regardless of the good’s price. For example, a flight that 
requires the passenger to wake up at 7 am to catch it is preferred to one that requires to wake up 
at 4 am. It is clear that the value of sleeping 3 more hours does not depend on the flight’s price. 
Nevertheless, experimental evidence shows that consumers are willing to add more money to get 
the preferred flight when the flight’s price is higher.  
I call this behavior “relative thinking.” Sometimes I also make the distinction between partial 
relative thinking (considering both absolute and relative differences) and full relative thinking 
(considering only relative differences). When I use just “relative thinking,” I mean partial 
relative thinking. The experiments mentioned below suggest that relative thinking exists in 
various economic contexts and therefore should be of great interest to researchers in economics 
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and management and to managers. This conclusion is reinforced by the empirical evidence on 
price dispersion, which suggests that firms respond to relative thinking.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some experimental evidence 
about relative thinking. Section 3 discusses how we can think about relative thinking and 
formalize this behavior. Sections 4, 5 and 6 discuss, respectively, why do people exhibit relative 
thinking, whether it is beneficial to do so, and whether experience and education can change 
relative thinking of people. Section 7 explains why firms seem to respond to relative thinking of 
consumers, and the last section discusses additional implications of relative thinking for 
economics and management. 
2. Experimental Evidence for Relative Thinking  
Several examples consistent with relative thinking have existed for over 20 years. Thaler 
(1980), in an article that proposes prospect theory as the basis for a positive theory of consumer 
choice, discusses various topics, one of which is the conjecture that people exert more effort to 
save $5 on a $25 radio than on a $500 TV. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) discuss framing 
effects and suggest that people generally evaluate acts in terms of a minimal account, which 
includes only the direct consequences of the act. To show an example in which people use a 
more inclusive account rather than a minimal account, they asked people whether they would 
drive 20 minutes to save $5 on a calculator when they are about to buy a calculator and a jacket. 
When the calculator’s price was $15 and the jacket’s price was $125, 68 percent of the subjects 
were willing to drive, but when the calculator’s price was $125 and the jacket’s price $15, only 
29 percent wanted to drive 20 minutes to save $5. Tversky and Kahneman interpret this result as   5
coming from a mental account that includes the price of the calculator but not that of the jacket, 
together with the curvature of the prospect theory value function.  
Tversky and Kahneman’s result was later replicated in several other studies. Mowen and 
Mowen (1986) show that the effect holds similarly for student subjects and for business 
managers subjects. Frisch (1993) shows that the effect holds also when only a calculator is being 
purchased. Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) vary the price of the second item (the jacket) and 
obtain similar results, and Darke and Freedman (1993) find that both the percentage discount and 
the absolute discount have an effect on consumer choice. Moon, Keasey and Duxbury (1999) 
find that the effect of relative savings is not detected when the level of absolute saving to be 
gained increases. 
In all those studies, the subjects were faced with the question whether they are willing to 
spend a certain amount of time to save a given amount, and the answers were therefore yes or no. 
So for each subject the experimenter knows only whether his time valuation, as reflected by his 
choice, exceeds the level of savings offered to him, or not. The results are then analyzed in terms 
of the percentage of subjects who chose to spend time and save money in the different 
treatments. This method significantly limits our ability to assess the magnitude of the effect of 
the good’s price on the valuation of time. We learn from these studies that people behave as if 
the value of their time is higher when they purchase a more expensive good.  But knowing that 
when the good’s price is lower a larger percentage of people are willing to spend a certain time 
to save a certain amount of money does not tell us by how much valuation of time increases 
when price increases. When the good’s price doubles, for example, is the valuation of time 
doubles, or less than doubles?    6
Moreover, it is not clear what is the reason that people exhibit this behavior. Maybe they 
have transaction utility (see Thaler, 1985) when they obtain a very good bargain, and they judge 
how good a bargain is by the percentage savings compared to some reference price. Or maybe 
they have a disutility from paying an unfair price, and to what extent a price is unfair they 
determine by examining the percentage difference in prices between the two stores. In that case, 
when a certain absolute price difference is bigger in percentage in one case, the expensive store 
will seem more unfair in this case, leading to more willingness to spend time and buy from the 
cheaper store.  
Azar (2004a), however, presents an experiment that allows to reject these alternative 
explanations for the observed behavior, and other potential explanations, thanks to an 
experimental design that differs from that of the previous studies. Moreover, he can examine 
quantitatively how increasing the good’s price affects the subjects’ valuation of their time. This 
allows him, for example, to refute the hypothesis of full relative thinking in favor of partial 
relative thinking. Two main changes in the experimental design allow for these advances over 
previous experiments in the literature: first, subjects are asked to provide a missing price rather 
than to answer a yes/no question, allowing to compute their valuation of their time (as reflected 
in their answer) rather than to know only whether it exceeds a certain threshold. Second, Azar 
uses nine different prices in the experiment, as opposed to only two or three in previous 
experiments, allowing him to reject alternative explanations for this behavior that could not be 
rejected previously.  
Specifically, Azar asked subjects to assume they are about to purchase a certain good, telling 
them what the price of the good is at a store they currently visit, and asking them for the maximal 
price for which they prefer to purchase the same good at another store (where purchasing from   7
the other store requires spending 20 more minutes going there etc.). The difference between the 
good’s price at the current store and the subject’s answer reflects the monetary compensation the 
subject requires for spending 20 minutes going to a different store. The experiment is between-
subjects, but the assignment of treatment (the good and its price) to subjects is random, and 
therefore if people behave rationally (exhibiting no relative thinking), the value of 20 minutes 
should be similar across treatments. In the experiment, however, the value of 20 minutes turns 
out to increase from $1.88 (for those who were told they are about to purchase a $3 pen) to 
$454.81 (in the $30,000 car treatment)!  
While the literature discussed above focused on the trade-off between time and money, Azar 
(2004b) shows that the same idea applies also in other domains. He presents subjects with two 
goods that are identical except for one characteristic: a flight that requires waking up at 4 am 
versus one that requires to wake up at 7 am, a hotel room with a view to the Swiss Alps versus 
one with a view to the parking lot, and a website that ships a desired book in 2 days versus one 
that takes a week. His experiment (conducted between subjects) shows that in all those cases, the 
price of the good affects how much people are willing to add to get the preferred good, even 
though the value of 3 hours of additional sleeping in the morning (or of the Alps view or the 
earlier book delivery) should not depend on the good’s price. Thus, Azar provides evidence that 
relative thinking is a general phenomenon that applies in many circumstances and not only when 
people have to make trade-offs between time and money.  
Moreover, the experiment uses, in addition to a sample of undergraduate students, a unique 
sample: participants in the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. 
These learned economists turn out to display relative thinking not less than undergraduate 
students. In addition, Azar shows once again that full relative thinking can be rejected in favor of   8
partial relative thinking. He multiplies the good’s price by 3 between the two treatments of the 
various questions in the experiment, and shows that the willingness to add for the preferred good 
increases, but less than triples.  
Azar also provides evidence for relative thinking in yet another context, and in this case also 
with real financial incentives to behave rationally.
4 In another experiment, subjects were asked to 
solve as many algebra questions as they wanted (up to a total of 50 questions) and were paid six 
cents for each correct answer. The treatments were the show-up fee; subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of three treatments, with show-up fees of $1, $3 and $10. Consequently, the six 
cents per correct answer were a different percentage of the total payoff in the various treatments, 
and this indeed had an effect on the subjects’ effort to solve the algebra questions.  
3. A Theory of Relative Thinking 
In this section, I want to discuss how relative thinking can be formalized in a simple model. 
The general structure of decision contexts in which relative thinking can be observed most easily 
is the following: there are two goods that are identical except for one attribute.
5 The consumer 
prefers one of the two goods. The differentiation between the goods can be either vertical (one 
good is clearly better than the other one – such as a room with a view versus a room without a 
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view), or horizontal (consumers can differ regarding which of the two goods they prefer – for 
example when the difference between the goods is the good’s color or the store’s location).
6  
We can then define the willingness to add (WTAD)
7 as follows: denote the price of the less-
preferred good by PL (L for “low-preference”). If the preferred good also costs PL or only slightly 
more, the consumer prefers it to the less-preferred good. If the preferred good is much more 
expensive than the less-preferred good, the consumer prefers the less-preferred good. Therefore, 
there is a certain threshold price for the preferred good for which the consumer is exactly 
indifferent between the two goods. If the price is above the threshold he prefers the cheaper 
good, and if the price is below the threshold, he prefers the preferred (and more expensive) good. 
Denote this threshold by PH (H for “high-preference”). Now the willingness to add is simply the 
difference between PH and PL: 
WTAD = PH − PL. 
Now suppose that we take two similar goods, and the difference between them is exactly the 
same difference as in the original pair of goods. For example, suppose that the original pair was 
two flights with departure times of 6 am and 9 am, where the consumer prefers (if prices are 
identical) the later flight, and where the earlier flight costs $150. Assume that the consumer told 
us that at a price of $180 for the later flight, he is exactly indifferent between the two. We can 
then compute that his WTAD is $30 = $180 − $150.  
The second pair of goods in this example could be two flights that leave at 6 am and 9 am, 
but where the earlier flight costs $300. Obviously, a rational consumer with well-defined 
preferences who is willing to add $30 to wake up 3 hours later in the first case, should be willing 
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to add the same amount in the second case, implying that PH should now be $330, and the 
WTAD should remain $30.  
This principle is true as long as two conditions are satisfied: (1) the difference between the 
goods is not related to their price level, and (2) the difference in PL between the two pairs is 
small enough that it does not create significant wealth effects. Let me elaborate on these two 
conditions to make them clear: 
(1) The difference between the goods is not related to their price level. If this condition does 
not hold, then it might be reasonable for the consumer to have a higher WTAD for the more 
expensive pair of goods. A few examples will make this clear. Suppose that identical goods are 
sold in two stores, but one store requires paying in cash, while the other store allows the 
customer to pay 3 months from today. The customer therefore prefers the second store. Here, 
however, it makes sense that the WTAD will be higher for more expensive goods, because the 
time value of money (3 months of free credit) is higher for more expensive goods.  
Another example is when one store gives a satisfaction-guaranteed, no-questions-asked 
return policy that allows to return merchandise for 3 months after purchase, while the other store 
allows to return items only if they are unopened, and only for 2 weeks after purchase. The value 
of the better return policy is that it reduces the customer’s risk of getting stuck with a good that 
turns out to be undesired. The value of the risk reduction is higher the more expensive is the 
good, and therefore the WTAD to buy from the better-return-policy store should be higher for 
more expensive goods. A similar example is when two sellers provide different warranty 
coverage for the same item. The value of the warranty is higher for more expensive goods, and 
therefore the WTAD will increase in price.     11
There are, however, many cases where the difference between the goods is not related to 
their price level. One example is the two flights with different departure times – the extra value 
of a more convenient departure time should not depend on the flight’s price. Similarly, when 
stores differ in their location, the extra value of the closer store stems from saving time going to 
the more remote store, and this value is the same regardless of the price of the good that the 
consumer is going to purchase.  
(2) The difference in PL between the two pairs is small enough that it does not create 
significant wealth effects 
If one pair of goods we consider is so much more expensive than the other pair, that the 
difference is significant compared to the consumer wealth, a wealth effect might change the 
analysis. If the consumer considers the cheaper pair of goods, he has much more wealth left than 
when he considers the more expensive pair. In this case (and absent relative thinking), the 
WTAD for the preferred good in the more expensive pair will be lower than the WTAD in the 
cheaper pair, because the consumer has smaller wealth left after purchase in the former case.
8 
Notice that this goes in the opposite direction to relative thinking (that causes the WTAD to be 
higher in the more expensive pair). Consequently, if we observe a behavior of relative thinking, 
it cannot come from wealth effects; on the contrary − if wealth effects are present, then the 
results underestimate the true extent of the relative thinking.  
As an example for the idea of wealth effects, suppose that the consumer wants to purchase a 
house, and the difference between the goods in each pair is whether to invest in new windows or 
not. One pair of goods is a house in the city center, which costs $500,000 (one good is the house 
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with its old windows, and the other good in the pair is the house with new windows). The other 
pair of goods is a house in the suburbs, with or without new windows, for a price of $150,000 
(the price for the house without new windows). Now we can ask the consumer in each case how 
much he is willing to add to replace the windows. Assuming that the $350,000 difference in the 
house’s price is significant compared to his wealth, the cheaper house leaves him much more 
wealth, and assuming that new windows are a normal good, the wealth effect means that absent 
relative thinking (and ignoring issues related to investment in the house in order to sell it later for 
a higher price), the consumer should be willing to add more for the windows if he buys the 
cheaper house. For the vast majority of goods, however, the difference in prices between the two 
goods are so small compared to the consumer’s wealth, that wealth effects are irrelevant.  
To summarize, under the two conditions discussed above, a rational consumer with well-
defined preferences should have the same WTAD regardless of PL for a constant difference 
between two goods. This is the case of a consumer that does not exhibit relative thinking. A 
consumer who exhibits relative thinking, will express a WTAD that increases with PL. We can 
write this formally as follows: 
WTAD = w(PL), 
where w is a function that increases in PL for relative-thinking consumers, and is constant in 
PL for rational consumers with well-defined preferences. Of course, WTAD depends on 
additional factors other than PL and the type of the consumer, such as the context of the decision 
problem. A simple and useful function to use for w is the following function: 
w(PL) = dPL
αβ, 
where d is a number that depends on the difference in utility between the two goods and is 
not a function of PL, and α and β are parameters between 0 and 1. α is a parameter that captures   13
the extent of relative thinking of a certain consumer, and β captures the extent of relative 
thinking inherent in a certain decision context. A completely rational consumer has α = 0, and 
therefore for him WTAD = d, i.e. his WTAD does not depend on PL. The extreme version of 
relative-thinking is captured by α = 1; for this consumer, in contexts that are the most prone to 
relative thinking (with β = 1), we will have WTAD = dPL, i.e. WTAD is proportional to PL, what 
we called before “full relative thinking.” In most cases in which relative thinking is relevant, 
however, α and β are both strictly between 0 and 1, and the result is partial relative thinking: 
increasing PL by x% raises WTAD by less than x%.  
Azar (2004a) formulates the “Golden Rule of Relative Thinking” as follows: “Relative 
thinking leads people to behave as if the value of their time is proportional to the square root of 
the price of the good they want to purchase.” This implies that αβ = 0.5 on average in the context 
of shopping for a good that can be purchased for a lower price at a more remote store.  
What determines the value of α? In general, some people have more tendency to relative 
thinking than others, and therefore α varies across people. A reasonable conjecture seems to be 
that people who make their choices in a more systematic way, and in a way that is closer to what 
the rational model prescribes (i.e. they think carefully about their preferences and maximize 
utility given their budget constraint), will exhibit less relative thinking than people who make 
decisions less systematically and more intuitively and spontaneously. In addition, experience and 
education may reduce the value of α; experience and education are discussed in more detail in 
Section 6. 
Azar (2004a) analyzes how relative thinking was affected by various individual 
characteristics, and he finds that students who studied more courses in economics exhibit less 
relative thinking. Both Azar (2004a) and Azar (2004b) find some evidence suggesting that males   14
exhibit relative thinking a little less than females. Surprisingly, Azar (2004b) finds that 
participants in the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society exhibit 
relative thinking slightly more than students, although the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
What affects the value of β? It is hard to formulate rules, but additional experimental 
research might help us understand in which contexts relative thinking is more common. One 
interesting result that Azar (2004b) finds, is that formulation of the decision problem in a way 
that the subject thinks about his willingness to accept (WTA) encourages relative thinking more 
than formulating it in a way that the subject thinks about his willingness to pay (WTP). The 
WTA formulation is one in which the subject is told the price of the preferred good, and is asked 
for the price of the less-preferred good that will make him indifferent between the two. The 
subject then has to consider a loss in the good’s quality compared to the reference good (the 
good whose price is provided), and therefore this resembles the concept of WTA (how much 
money you require in order to give up something you have – in this case the good quality). In the 
WTP formulation the subject is provided the price of the less-preferred good and he has to 
provide the price of the preferred good that will make him indifferent between the two. The 
subject considers a gain in the good’s quality compared to the reference good, and this resembles 
WTP (how much you are willingness to pay for something you do not have). 
The concept of WTAD and the discussion above applies to relative thinking in the context of 
product differentiation (which can come either from the goods being different, or from the sellers 
being different – in their location, return policy, etc.). The main idea, however, namely that 
people consider relative differences and not only absolute differences, applies to other contexts 
as well. In search models, for example, consumers without relative thinking have search costs   15
that are independent of the good’s price; consumers with full relative thinking behave as if their 
search costs are proportional to the good’s price; and consumers who exhibit partial relative 
thinking behave as if their search costs are increasing in the good’s price, but less than 
proportionally (i.e. when the good’s price is multiplied by z, they behave as if their search costs 
increased by z
α, where 0 < α < 1). The same principle probably applies to the perception of 
people regarding wages, interest rates, tax rates and so on. If people for some reason are 
“programmed” to consider relative differences in addition to absolute differences, there is no 
apparent reason why this should be limited to prices only. Additional research along these lines 
is called for.  
4. Why Do People Think about Relative Differences?  
4.1. Weber’s Law 
An intriguing question is why people think about relative differences when the rational thing 
to do is to think only about absolute differences. An idea where this tendency might come from 
is Weber’s Law, which states that our ability to distinguish between two stimuli depends on their 
relative difference, rather than their absolute difference. That is, for each type of stimulus we 
have a constant k and we can tell that two stimuli x1 and x2 (assume without loss of generality 
that x2 > x1) are different in their magnitudes, if and only if x2 > kx1, where k > 1. This law was 
found to be true for various senses and stimuli and for almost all levels of stimulus except for 
very high or very low ones (Miller, 1962). For example, suppose that when we evaluate weight 
using our hands the minimum weight that we can distinguish from 10 grams is 12 grams. Then   16
when we have instead 100 grams, we cannot distinguish it from 102 grams; the minimal 
distinguishable weight will be about 120 grams.  
This explanation for relative thinking resembles the justification that Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) gave for why people look on changes in their wealth rather than the terminal wealth 
levels. They explain that our perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or 
differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes, and that stimuli are perceived in 
relation to a reference point (e.g. if we dip our hand in water of 15 degrees Celsius and then 
move it to 30 degrees, the latter feels hot; if we dip our hand in 45 degrees and then in 30 
degrees, the latter feels cold). Accordingly, prospect theory is based on a value function that 
represents the idea that one’s utility depends on gains and losses compared to his reference point 
rather than on his terminal wealth level. Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman (1991, p.1057) 
explain loss aversion in choice as coming from the asymmetry between pain and pleasure: “… 
pain is more urgent than pleasure. The asymmetry of pain and pleasure is the ultimate 
justification of loss aversion in choice.”  
The explanations for relative thinking and the existence of reference point and of loss 
aversion share the feature that they make an inference from how we perceive the physical world 
to how we perceive economic problems, an inference that is not necessarily true. My senses 
might be limited by Weber’s Law, but I can still understand that $100 is different from $100.01 
even though the relative difference is very small. I can also check my bank account and be happy 
that I have in it a million dollars even if I lost today $1000. And while pain is more urgent than 
pleasure in the physical world, this does not imply necessarily that I suffer more from $20 loss 
than from a forgone gain of $20.    17
Although Weber’s Law does not necessarily imply that we should exhibit relative thinking in 
economic contexts, it is suggestive why we do so (a similar argument can be made regarding the 
reference point and loss aversion). Since our perception system and various instincts we adopted 
over millions of years of evolution act according to relative differences rather than absolute 
differences (as Weber’s Law suggests), it is quite natural that we also exhibit relative thinking in 
economic contexts.  
One example where the relationship between Weber’s Law and relative thinking about prices 
seems natural is when memory is involved. We do not remember the exact price of everything 
we buy, but we have a vague memory of how much it costs, and the inaccuracy (in dollars) in 
which we remember the price is increasing in the good’s price. If we ask people to provide a 95-
percent confidence interval about the price of something they purchased a week ago, the range 
will generally be increasing in the good’s price. Consequently, we will identify a difference in 
the price in the future only if it is above a certain threshold, which is an increasing function of 
the good’s price (though not necessarily a fixed percentage of the good’s price). Consequently, 
with goods that we buy on a regular basis (such as food), we might decide to purchase a larger 
quantity than the usual one if we observe a lower price (either at another store we go to, or 
because of a price change in our regular store), but to observe a lower price the difference has to 
be higher than a threshold that is increasing in the good’s price. This can explain why “Retailers 
have long recognized that markdowns of less than 20 percent generally go unnoticed” (Kindra, 
Laroche and Muller, 1989, p.80).   18
4.2. Evolution 
Can relative thinking be the result of an evolutionary process, i.e. does it enhance the fitness 
of humans? Since evolution of species is a process that occurs over millions of years, we should 
look not whether this tendency is beneficial today, but rather whether it was beneficial tens and 
hundreds of thousands of years ago. It may be the case that thinking about relative differences 
was more useful than thinking about absolute differences in the evolution of human beings. 
While I know too little about human evolution to make any specific claims regarding whether 
and how relative thinking might have been useful in the past, I think that exploring this issue is a 
worthwhile endeavor for future research by biologists, psychologists, sociologists and 
anthropologists as well as economists.  
5. Is Relative Thinking Beneficial Today?  
In today’s environment, is it helpful to think in relative terms (for example to think about 
percentages)? If the agent is unboundedly rational and mental processes (thinking, memorizing, 
etc.) are costless, the answer is no. Thinking about absolute levels allows us to implicitly think 
also about ratios and percentages when this is relevant; but thinking automatically about 
percentages regardless of the context leads to non-optimal decisions, for example making too 
little effort to save money on high-price goods, and too much effort to save on low-price goods. 
If I think about absolute levels and I know that I have to drive 20 minutes to save $30 on a 
$1,500 computer, for instance, I can compute that this means that I save 2 percent on the 
computer, and I can use this figure if it is relevant in the problem I face. But if I only think about 
percentages and therefore I am only aware that I save 2 percent, but not the absolute magnitude 
of the saving, I lose valuable information and might not optimize as well.    19
The conclusion that relative thinking is not beneficial, however, might change if we 
introduce various sorts of bounded rationality, such as deliberation costs, limited ability to 
analyze problems, and limited memory capacity. Consider the case of deliberation costs, for 
example, and assume that every additional variable in the decision problem makes it more time 
consuming (and therefore costly) to solve the problem. To have a concrete example in mind, 
suppose that I go to the grocery store once a week, and for every good that I buy I have to decide 
whether to buy a small package that suffices for one week or a bigger one that suffices for three 
weeks. If it were not time consuming, I should have examined for every good, among other 
things, the difference in prices between the two sizes, the interest rate I earn in the bank, the rate 
with which the freshness of the product declines and how it affects my utility from it, whether 
there are increasing returns to scale in purchasing (I may spend less time with the cashier if I buy 
the large packages, for example), and if I am a hyperbolic discounter, also how tempted I will be 
to consume more if I buy the large box.
9 With deliberation costs, however, I might be better off 
coming up with a rule of thumb (e.g. to buy the larger box if it saves me at least 10 percent 
compared to buying three smaller boxes) rather than solving each decision problem separately.
10  
6. Experience and Education 
Another interesting question is whether this tendency to think about relative differences 
disappears with experience. The experiments reported above suggest that the answer is no, since 
adults make the trade offs they were asked to do in the experiment (between money and time or 
                                                 
9 I suspect that if I buy my annual consumption of chocolate at the beginning of the year, I will finish it much before 
the year is over, for example… 
10 Baumeister (2003, p. 13), for example, argues that “making decisions consumes one of the self’s important inner 
resources. This is probably one reason people are creatures of habit: Habit, routine, and automatic processes avoid 
having to expend resources by making choices.”   20
various dimensions of quality) everyday for years, and still they exhibited relative thinking. It is 
possible, however, that experience mitigates relative thinking to some extent. Examining the 
effect of experience is an interesting topic for future research. I suspect, however, that even if 
experience mitigates relative thinking, it is very context-sensitive: for example, someone who 
makes often the trade-off between convenience of flights and their price may realize that he 
should be unwilling to pay more to wake up three hours later when the flight ticket is more 
expensive, but still exhibit relative thinking in other contexts.  
Is it possible to educate people about relative thinking, and if so, will it change their 
behavior? The answer to both questions seems positive. We can explain people that this tendency 
exists, and give them a few examples in which it is not optimal (such as when searching too 
much for low-price goods or too little for high-price goods). Once the consumer is aware of 
relative thinking, he can overcome his tendency to quit looking or negotiating for a better price 
too soon when purchasing something expensive, and to spend to much effort to save when 
buying something cheap. Obviously, when relative thinking is a useful and parsimonious rule of 
thumb, the consumer can retain this rule even when he is aware of relative thinking.  
7. Do Firms Respond to Relative Thinking? 
When experiments detect a behavior that departs from that of a selfish and unboundedly 
rational agent, economists usually want to know whether this behavior affects markets in any 
way. Do we observe any response of firms to relative thinking? A full treatment of this question 
is beyond the scope of this article, but I will describe briefly why it seems that they do. The first 
step in answering this question is to recognize how firms should react to relative thinking.    21
Price competition with homogenous products leads to the Bertrand paradox where prices 
equal marginal cost, and in that case consumers and their biases have no effect on the 
equilibrium. In many markets, however, despite seemingly homogeneous goods, prices are above 
marginal cost and not all firms charge the same price. These observations are often explained by 
either seller heterogeneity (models such as the linear city) or by search models that assume that 
searching for the lowest price is costly.  
Seller heterogeneity (for example because of different geographical location of the sellers), 
leads to product differentiation and potentially (if asymmetries exist) to price differences. How 
much the sellers differ from each other is captured by the concept of transportation costs. If the 
sellers differ in their geographical location, for example, the transportation costs reflect the time 
and effort required to go to each seller, and the more remote the sellers are from each other, the 
higher those transportation costs would be. Since price differences are the result of product 
differentiation, the higher is the product differentiation (i.e. higher transportation costs), the more 
price dispersion we would expect to see.  
If consumers exhibit relative thinking, they behave as if their transportation costs are higher 
when they purchase a more expensive good (e.g. they require higher compensation to drive 20 
minutes to a cheaper store when the good’s price is higher). If firms know this and respond to it, 
price dispersion will be higher for more expensive goods. If, on the other hand, consumers do not 
exhibit relative thinking or firms do not respond to it, transportation costs are independent of the 
good’s price (because the cost of going to a remote store does not depend on the good’s price), 
and therefore absolute price dispersion (i.e. price dispersion that is not divided by the good’s 
price, e.g. the standard deviation of prices) should also be independent of the good’s price.    22
In search models, a similar result holds. Price dispersion is the result of costly search, and 
therefore higher search costs generally lead to more price dispersion. If consumers exhibit no 
relative thinking, their search costs are independent of the good’s price, and therefore price 
dispersion should be independent of the good’s price. If consumers exhibit relative thinking and 
firms respond to it, then consumers behave as if their search costs are higher when they purchase 
more expensive goods, and this leads firms to choose prices such that absolute price dispersion is 
higher for more expensive goods.   
To summarize, both seller heterogeneity models and search models lead to the conclusion 
that if firms respond to relative thinking of consumers, then price dispersion should be an 
increasing function of the good’s price, but otherwise price dispersion should not be affected by 
the good’s price. What do we know about the relationship between price dispersion and the 
good’s price? Studies of price dispersion in various markets find a very strong positive 
relationship between price dispersion and the good’s price (or the good’s cost, which is 
obviously positively related to the good’s price). Examples include Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser 
(1979); Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2001); Sorensen (2000); and Aalto-Setälä (2003). The 
strong positive relationship between price and price dispersion supports the idea that firms 
respond to relative thinking of consumers.  
Another example for response of firms to relative thinking can be seen in advertisements of 
sales by car manufacturers. Because cars’ prices cannot be reduced by a significant percentage, 
when a car manufacturer wants to reduce the price of a car from $25,000 to $24,000, it usually 
chooses to advertise the sale as a $1,000 cash-back (an increase of infinite percentage, from $0 to 
$1,000 cash-back) rather than as a reduction of the price from $25,000 to $24,000 (only 4 
percent reduction). Similar reason probably leads to the common practice to advertise low   23
interest rates (e.g. “0.0% APR”) rather than a reduction in the car’s price. Obviously, a reduction 
in the car’s price reduces the monthly payment just as a reduction in the interest rate does. A 
reduction from 6% interest to 0%, however, looks much more significant (it is a 100% reduction 
in the interest rate) than the equivalent reduction in the car’s price.  
8. Implications of Relative Thinking for Other Areas in Economics and Management 
The article suggests that people exhibit relative thinking in various economic contexts and 
that firms respond to this behavior. While the current article focuses on the implications of 
relative thinking in product markets, relative thinking is more general and has implications in 
many other areas in economics and management (as well as in other disciplines). One example is 
labor markets. Relative thinking affects the optimal choice of incentive schemes. For example, 
increasing the fixed payment to a worker reduces the perceived magnitude of the pay-for-
performance component, because it becomes a smaller percentage of total compensation, and this 
might reduce the worker’s effort. In addition, the optimal wage increase when workers are 
promoted (or if the firm increases the wage annually) may be different if workers respond to the 
percentage increase rather than to the dollar increase.  
Relative thinking also has various policy implications. Suppose that the government has to 
increase taxes to cover a budget deficit and that increasing the highest rate of income tax from 40 
to 41 percent yields the same revenue as increasing sales tax from 10 to 11 percent. Assume that 
the two alternatives have a similar effect on social welfare and that the government wants to take 
the step that will be perceived as a smaller tax increase. Since the difference between 40 and 41 
is smaller in relative terms than the difference between 10 and 11, this suggests that the increase 
in income tax may look less significant and cause less resistance. Similarly, a government in an   24
inflationary country that wants to increase the interest rate in order to encourage savings and 
alleviate the inflationary pressures might have more effect on household behavior by advertising 
that the CPI-linked interest rate is raised from 3 to 4 percent, than by advertising an increase in 
the nominal interest rate from 23 to 24 percent.  
How firms should compare their price or quality to market benchmarks is also influenced by 
relative thinking. For example, consider a mutual fund manager who has to compare his previous 
performance to the market benchmark in a brochure for potential investors. If the manager 
achieved a return of 16 percent when the market index increased by 19 percent, he should use the 
numbers 19 and 16 percent. But if he achieved 19 percent when the index increased by 16 
percent, he should advertise that he outperformed the index by 3 percentage points, because 3 
compared to 0 (which is the natural reference point) seems a bigger difference than the 
difference between 19 and 16.  
Relative thinking has also many implications in product markets in addition to those 
mentioned in the previous sections. A firm that sells many goods, such as a grocery store or a 
department store, might gain by reducing the prices of low-price goods and increasing the prices 
of high-price goods (compared to their optimal levels without relative thinking). If consumers 
decide in which store to buy according to the average relative difference in prices rather than 
according to the difference in the total cost of what they buy, this strategy can attract more 
customers and increase profits.  
How firms should frame their prices is also affected by relative thinking. One example was 
mentioned before: a cash-back of $1,000 on a $25,000 car has greater impact than a reduction of 
the price from $25,000 to $24,000. For another example, if a car dealer wants the client to   25
upgrade from an AM/FM radio to a CD player, it is better to present it as an increase in the car’s 
cost from $25,000 to $25,300 than to frame it as a separate $300 purchase.  
Relative thinking, which implies that the willingness to pay for a more convenient location or 
more desired product characteristics is increasing in the good’s price, also affects optimal 
location choice, both geographically and in the product space. For example, if by being located 
20 minutes away from the city center a firm can reduce the price of the goods it sells by $5 per 
item, this might be worthwhile for a firm that sells $70 VCRs, but not for a firm that sells $2,000 
notebook computers, because of the different effect of the $5 savings on the willingness to drive 
to the remote store in the two cases.  
These are only a few examples for the importance of relative thinking in economic contexts, 
and how firms can exploit this behavior. Relative thinking is a wide-spread phenomenon that 
was virtually ignored by economists so far. I hope that this article will encourage economists to 
think more about this phenomenon and how it affects markets. 
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